

of the DRE. Continuing, he stated we all make mistakes, and this was one of ours. If it appeared to be a stab in the back, it was unintentional. He stated the newspapermen had invited them to lunch at the best restaurant in Miami. Burt stated the purpose was to interview Rocha after lunch regarding his trip and stay in Cuba. He also assured them that anything said during lunch was "off the record". Burt continued by stating it was known that the DRE received financial aid from CIA and that there were certain disagreements between the DRE and the U.S. Government. Continuing in this vein, he extracted juicy tidbits he later printed. In short the (Boys) didn't know when to keep their mouths shut. Mr. Helms stated that knowing something of the newspaper business, he fully understood and accepted Lass's explanation.

3. Mr. Helms then gave Lass a dutch uncle talk regarding the DRE's press releases and TV interviews. Mr. Helms explained, whereas newspaper headlines today could deceive them into feeling certain prestige, he, Lass, could rest assured today's headlines contained no long term dividends. At a time when offensive weapons, such as IRBM's and IL-28's were subjects of negotiations of utmost concern to the highest elements in the U.S. Government, irresponsible press releases and TV interviews were subject of some irritation in U.S. Government

circles. Still, according to Mr. Helms, if the DRE decided to act in a responsible manner, they could do themselves real good in reporting full details on missiles and underground storage areas, giving time for the Agency to confirm the information before they ran off releasing it to the press, causing considerable displeasure within U.S. Government circles and exhibiting the DRE as a bunch of hotheaded, irresponsible, youth. Mr. Helms also mentioned that if we could not reach an agreement and work in unison in pushing toward our mutual goal, there was no need in working at cross purposes. Mr. Lasa fully appreciated and understood the irritation their press releases and TV interviews were causing the U.S. Government.

4. Mr. Lasa stated they had been led to believe in Miami that aid to all Cuban exile organization was being cut back and that operational expenses for November were not passed to the DRE. He asked if this meant the U.S. had decided to co-exist with Castro. Mr. Helms stated no such decision had been made by the U.S. Government. Lasa also stated that although Rocha has discussed a variety of different subjects with his Miami contacts, to Lasa's knowledge the conversations to discuss the overall terms of our relationship which they expected after his last trip to Washington never have taken place, and he certainly has not been party to any discussion. Mr. Helms


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indicated he wanted to discuss and settle this subject with Mr. Rocha the following day. A meeting was set by Mr. Helms for 1030 hours, 13 November 1962 with Mr. Rocha, leaving it up to Mr. Rocha if he, Rocha, desired Lasa to be present or not. In due respect to Mr. Rocha Mr. Helms did not feel he should dictate who Mr. Rocha should bring to the meeting.

5. On a strictly personal basis, if a co-existance policy is decided upon, Mr. Lasa asked Mr. Helms if he could help him obtain employment in Washington. He stated he had his sister and four nieces to support as his brother-in-law was in jail in Cuba, and he (Lasa) could not afford to be without work. Mr. Helms stated he couldn't promise anything, but would certainly do whatever possible.

6. After the meeting with Mr. Helms, arrangements were made for reservations at the Dupont Plaza. Back at the hotel Lasa again called Miami and this time was able to talk with Rocha. Lasa asked Rocha to come to Washington with full power and authority to make decisions for the DRE as the conversations the following day with Lasa's friend (Mr. Helms) would decide the future of the DRE. Lasa suggested Rocha advise "La Vaca Sagrada", "El Gordo" (Salvat) that Rocha was exercising his executive powers as Secretary General of the DRE when he came to Washington. Lasa later explained they always consulted with each other if at all possible before the Secretary General




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exercised his executive power. Rocha stated he would take the plane from Miami at 2300 hours, 12 November 1962.

7. Summarizing the conversation that followed at the hotel, Neesma admitted he was pessimistic about future U.S. policy toward Cuba. He felt the latest U.S. action had such favorable response both domestically and internationally that he doubted the Kennedy administration would risk tarnishing this victory with an invasion of Cuba. I reiterated what Mr. Holmes had said earlier that it was impossible to say as no decision had been reached.

Nestor D. Sanchez
NESTOR D. SANCHEZ
TFT, PA-PROP

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14-00000
12 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Helms' Conversation with Jose Lasa of the DDCB

PERSONS PRESENT: Mr. Helms, Mr. Jose Lasa, Nestor D. Sanchez (alias Nicholas Sylva) 67
(L. Helms)

TIME AND PLACE: 1500 - 1630 hours /Mr. Helms' Office

1. Mr. Helms was interested in any details known to Lasa regarding the 80 odd missiles referred to by Luis Fernandez Rocha in his 12 November New York TV interview. Lasa was unable to furnish any details and admitted the figure of 80 was unfamiliar to him. Mr. Helms returned to a meeting in the Director's office. During Mr. Helms' absence Lasa telephoned Miami attempting to reach Rocha in order to confirm his previous telephone message for Rocha to return to Washington the night of 12 November. Lasa was unable to reach Manuel Salvat as the latter had already departed for the airport to meet Rocha.

2. At approximately 1530 Mr. Helms' returned from the Director's office. In resuming the conversation Mr. Lasa was anxious to discuss the episode with Al Burt of the Miami Herald. Before relating the details Lasa explained he was making no excuses as the incident was sheer stupidity on the part

VPN